Totally honest?
The Somali pirate problem is a rate problem complicated by an unwillingness or lack of ability for ships to prevent their being taken. One factor is the unwillingness for many international ports to tolerate the carriage of firearms aboard ships docked there. Another is the skill and equipment requirements to successfully fight off attacks. A third is the cost of committing a company's resources to such an effort when it's unnecessary in other locations. If someone had the resources, they could probably solve the problem in a relatively simple way.
Basically, take 3 or 4 mother ships (and a spare) and station them in the shipping lanes outside the pirates' area of control. The mother ships would essentially provide basic amenities and staging locations for a number of professional defense teams. Ships transiting the pirate's area rendezvous with a mother ship, take aboard a defense team and gear, then transit the pirate zone. On the other end, they simply rendezvous with another mother ship and deboard the team.
Within the piracy zone, the defense teams do a number of things. They utilize high quality observational equipment and communication gear to track, identify, and report other traffic. If another craft appears to be a threat, they report it to their mother ship and local naval assets in the area. This way, if it's possible, the naval assets perform the primary defense. Only if a boarding is imminent do the defense teams engage the pirates with small arms or other means while providing recorded, secure transmissions of what occurs for use later in courts.
In this way, ships can use the service on a contractual basis, minimizing the company resources required for security in the area, as well as remain able to dock in any port. Additionally, as long as the mother ships can be replenished and maintained in international waters, they can continue to provide long-term support. Depending on the type of ship and the resources available, the mother ships could also act as floating support bases for aviation assets.
The combination would probably be cost effective if there was a significant reduction in captures (and ransoms) and the costs of the service was lower than the costs of capture.
For smaller, perhaps non-commercial shipping, perhaps a weapon or transmitter leasing service might also be worthwhile.
Just an idea...
