With the freak show that is the political side of the debt ceiling debate and the desire on one side to raise taxes, I've been thinking about wealth...
Wealth is more than resources because--at a certain point--the resources you get from wealth far exceed those you can actually use. I mean, you can eat $10 in donuts if you really, really want to, but there's no way you can physically consume $100,000 in donuts before they all go bad.
And--if you did--it would probably kill you.
So, there's a point in the scale of wealthiness where wealth becomes wealth for wealth's sake or a means of competition with similarly wealthy people...
The other thing that tends to happen above a certain point, is a huge increase in mobility.
So, a "rich" person who makes $150,000 a year is probably tied to a particular address because that home and/or the workplace is the source of their wealth. Someone who's got $1.5 million a year probably has multiple addresses and--if they have the liquid funds--can literally move almost anywhere in the world.
Which is why--at the wealth-for-wealth's sake level--many taxes and legal liabilities become a matter of emotional connection with some group and not something practically enforceable. Simply having the means to pick up and leave makes it so they can change the rules for themselves by simply changing their location.
That's why places like Dubai, Monaco, Liechtenstein, and other tax-havens exist. People there get phenomenally wealthy because of the portability of wealth and the mobility of the rich.
So, taxing the hell out of people that are "rich" (i.e. non-mobile rich) can get a lot of money until such point their means of getting money goes away. For example, you tax the hell out of a Doctor, their costs go up--or try to until they hit the limits on insurance--and then they either become specialists of some sort so they can charge more or they just get out of the practice and work in some other capacity to pay off their loans.
(Yeah, MD's aren't really rich, for the most part, because of the cost of their education.)
If you try that with the mobile rich, they leave the country, hire tax lawyers, and use their money to protect their money.
Works the same way with corporations. Unless they are tied to a particular, physical location--like a mine--you're ability to tax them is solely based on their skill with the tax law and their attachment to a particular place/government/people. And the more you make that attachment painful, the more you end up with a company that--legally--exists only in a PO Box in a tax-friendly tax-haven somewhere.
All the while, leaving people screaming about the "tax loopholes" and trying to carry water with a spaghetti strainer.
If you wanted an honest fix, you have to give these people a reason--an advantage--to "be attached" to one group or one location, get them integrated and then manage the taxes so both they and the people around them profit.
But, that's just my opinion.
Monday, August 1, 2011
Monday, July 25, 2011
"Why not just cut Congressional and Presidential pay?"
That is the question a lot of friends and even family members keep suggesting as the ongoing economic crises flow through the news.
Ignoring for a moment that the combination of Congressional and Presidential pay is a tiny drop in the bucket of the Federal budget and the fact the budget killers are entitlement programs tied to demographic problems and increased human longevity, let's entertain the possibility...
One meme in Facebook lists the current pay of these elected offices as:
The amounts seem reasonably correct, though probably don't include certain allowances required for the performance of duties. Also, the inclusion of a serving soldier as a benchmark is a nice touch.
The idea of reducing governmental salaries of the President, former presidents, and the legislative branch, potentially to a level similar to that of a deployed US soldier, is assumed to be a good thing for the economic condition of the country. I, however, disagree and not for partisan political reasons.
Let me explain why...
The primary purpose of elected politicians is to serve as representatives of those who elected them. The ideal situation in a democratic form of government is one where the elected official would both act in the best interest of the electors and make the same decision the electors would make if provided the information and authority.
One measure tied to this idea of elected official as proxy is the maintenance of a sense of connection between the official and those who elected them. In the case of legislators, this often includes a requirement to maintain an office and/or residence in the district they were elected from. This--functionally--requires the elected official to maintain two residences unless they happen to live within easy commuting distance of Washington, DC. This also requires transportation on a semi-regular basis between the home district/state and Washington in order to carry out their functions in both places.
A second measure towards maintaining connection is term length. By putting the legislator in front of voters on a regular basis for election and reelection, the voters are able to make an overall assessment on the legislator's actions on their behalf. Although arguably not a unique situation, this process--the election cycle--also adds to the fiscal and emotional costs for legislators.
Additionally, in order for voters to trust a candidate enough to vote for them in the first place, a candidate must have some sort of history--either as a legislator at a lower level or in some capacity of publicly documented political, legal, or economically relevant skill--to base an assessment upon. This means getting elected to Congress (or the Presidency) is not an entry-level job and often requires a long vetting process to be a viable candidate.
However, these representatives are allowed a significant benefit in exchange for these costs; the power to create legislation and to exercise power over their fellow citizens in a somewhat unique scope of authority.
So, what's the problem with paying them less?
The first problem is one of motivation. No one tries to get elected for the money; at least no politician in their right mind would suggest such a thing. It's a reasonably high salary compared to many career professions and several times higher than that of the typical state-level legislator (or a US soldier). The requirements to keep two residences and/or commute to Washington DC offsets some of the pay increase, however.
Motivation--in this case--is often tied to a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of the job where the motivation--ideally--is to both serve their electorate and to be recognized as a trustworthy executor of political and economic power. The ideal motivation being a focus on service to the electorate or even the reputation (or legacy) derived from the positions.
Cutting legislator pay essentially creates a conflict for legislators, especially those with families, by forcing their job requirements to be at odds with a stable family life and the measures suggested to remain connected with their electorate. This creates a situation where the working conditions of the job selects for people who are more willing to sacrifice their own family stability (and potentially their constituent's) as a normal part of their decision-making process in order to continue to function in the position.
However, legislators with alternative sources of income may bypass this difficulty. While this "relieves" the taxpayers of some of the burden to support legislators, the motivations and economic ties of well off politicians may cause other difficulties including the potential for these connections to directly influence votes against the will of the represented electorate. In other words, these self-supporting legislators may also be more willing to support themselves and their close connections at the expense of their constituents.
One final problem is that of competition. Given a choice, how many people would allow a medical doctor being paid $10 an hour to operate on them or a loved one?
Most people probably would resist being treated by that surgeon because they are accustomed to getting what they pay for and a deal that looks too good to be true usually has some serious faults attached. In this case, a question about the doctor's capabilities as most experienced, capable surgeons can command a much, much higher rate of pay.
Likewise, most politicians--like doctors--tend to be professional careerists. They have a history in politics or a closely related field, they are respected, and they usually have other options. Cutting the pay for elected offices simply make the jobs less competitive by increasing the personal costs and allowing other opportunities--like lobbying firms, political action committees, and non-elected executive positions--to draw off those with more talent and attachment to their families.
The people who remain and are willing to stand for office are those who have fewer options because they have been less successful, are more motivated by the unique power over others in politics--at the expense of family or money--or are different enough ideologically to ignore the expectations of others and therefore reduce the perceived stress within the position(s).
In all cases, it means those who stand for election would be less like us, more likely not to act in our best interest because of different values, and unlikely to make the same decisions we would make if provided the information and authority these politicians are provided.
Ultimately, it's not an ideal situation and no politician ever behaves in a way all of their voters approve of, but one guarantee in life is if you pay a cheap wage, you get cheap (or desperate) workers.
Ignoring for a moment that the combination of Congressional and Presidential pay is a tiny drop in the bucket of the Federal budget and the fact the budget killers are entitlement programs tied to demographic problems and increased human longevity, let's entertain the possibility...
One meme in Facebook lists the current pay of these elected offices as:
Salary of the US President. ..$400,000
Salary of retired US Presidents ...$180,000
Salary of House/Senate...$174,000
Salary of Speaker of the House.. .$223,500
Salary of Majority/Minority Leaders... $193,400
Average Salary of Soldier DEPLOYED IN IRAQ $38,000
I think we found where the cuts should be made! If you agree... repost
The amounts seem reasonably correct, though probably don't include certain allowances required for the performance of duties. Also, the inclusion of a serving soldier as a benchmark is a nice touch.
The idea of reducing governmental salaries of the President, former presidents, and the legislative branch, potentially to a level similar to that of a deployed US soldier, is assumed to be a good thing for the economic condition of the country. I, however, disagree and not for partisan political reasons.
Let me explain why...
The primary purpose of elected politicians is to serve as representatives of those who elected them. The ideal situation in a democratic form of government is one where the elected official would both act in the best interest of the electors and make the same decision the electors would make if provided the information and authority.
One measure tied to this idea of elected official as proxy is the maintenance of a sense of connection between the official and those who elected them. In the case of legislators, this often includes a requirement to maintain an office and/or residence in the district they were elected from. This--functionally--requires the elected official to maintain two residences unless they happen to live within easy commuting distance of Washington, DC. This also requires transportation on a semi-regular basis between the home district/state and Washington in order to carry out their functions in both places.
A second measure towards maintaining connection is term length. By putting the legislator in front of voters on a regular basis for election and reelection, the voters are able to make an overall assessment on the legislator's actions on their behalf. Although arguably not a unique situation, this process--the election cycle--also adds to the fiscal and emotional costs for legislators.
Additionally, in order for voters to trust a candidate enough to vote for them in the first place, a candidate must have some sort of history--either as a legislator at a lower level or in some capacity of publicly documented political, legal, or economically relevant skill--to base an assessment upon. This means getting elected to Congress (or the Presidency) is not an entry-level job and often requires a long vetting process to be a viable candidate.
However, these representatives are allowed a significant benefit in exchange for these costs; the power to create legislation and to exercise power over their fellow citizens in a somewhat unique scope of authority.
So, what's the problem with paying them less?
The first problem is one of motivation. No one tries to get elected for the money; at least no politician in their right mind would suggest such a thing. It's a reasonably high salary compared to many career professions and several times higher than that of the typical state-level legislator (or a US soldier). The requirements to keep two residences and/or commute to Washington DC offsets some of the pay increase, however.
Motivation--in this case--is often tied to a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of the job where the motivation--ideally--is to both serve their electorate and to be recognized as a trustworthy executor of political and economic power. The ideal motivation being a focus on service to the electorate or even the reputation (or legacy) derived from the positions.
Cutting legislator pay essentially creates a conflict for legislators, especially those with families, by forcing their job requirements to be at odds with a stable family life and the measures suggested to remain connected with their electorate. This creates a situation where the working conditions of the job selects for people who are more willing to sacrifice their own family stability (and potentially their constituent's) as a normal part of their decision-making process in order to continue to function in the position.
However, legislators with alternative sources of income may bypass this difficulty. While this "relieves" the taxpayers of some of the burden to support legislators, the motivations and economic ties of well off politicians may cause other difficulties including the potential for these connections to directly influence votes against the will of the represented electorate. In other words, these self-supporting legislators may also be more willing to support themselves and their close connections at the expense of their constituents.
One final problem is that of competition. Given a choice, how many people would allow a medical doctor being paid $10 an hour to operate on them or a loved one?
Most people probably would resist being treated by that surgeon because they are accustomed to getting what they pay for and a deal that looks too good to be true usually has some serious faults attached. In this case, a question about the doctor's capabilities as most experienced, capable surgeons can command a much, much higher rate of pay.
Likewise, most politicians--like doctors--tend to be professional careerists. They have a history in politics or a closely related field, they are respected, and they usually have other options. Cutting the pay for elected offices simply make the jobs less competitive by increasing the personal costs and allowing other opportunities--like lobbying firms, political action committees, and non-elected executive positions--to draw off those with more talent and attachment to their families.
The people who remain and are willing to stand for office are those who have fewer options because they have been less successful, are more motivated by the unique power over others in politics--at the expense of family or money--or are different enough ideologically to ignore the expectations of others and therefore reduce the perceived stress within the position(s).
In all cases, it means those who stand for election would be less like us, more likely not to act in our best interest because of different values, and unlikely to make the same decisions we would make if provided the information and authority these politicians are provided.
Ultimately, it's not an ideal situation and no politician ever behaves in a way all of their voters approve of, but one guarantee in life is if you pay a cheap wage, you get cheap (or desperate) workers.
Friday, February 18, 2011
Somali Pirates...
Totally honest?
The Somali pirate problem is a rate problem complicated by an unwillingness or lack of ability for ships to prevent their being taken. One factor is the unwillingness for many international ports to tolerate the carriage of firearms aboard ships docked there. Another is the skill and equipment requirements to successfully fight off attacks. A third is the cost of committing a company's resources to such an effort when it's unnecessary in other locations. If someone had the resources, they could probably solve the problem in a relatively simple way.
Basically, take 3 or 4 mother ships (and a spare) and station them in the shipping lanes outside the pirates' area of control. The mother ships would essentially provide basic amenities and staging locations for a number of professional defense teams. Ships transiting the pirate's area rendezvous with a mother ship, take aboard a defense team and gear, then transit the pirate zone. On the other end, they simply rendezvous with another mother ship and deboard the team.
Within the piracy zone, the defense teams do a number of things. They utilize high quality observational equipment and communication gear to track, identify, and report other traffic. If another craft appears to be a threat, they report it to their mother ship and local naval assets in the area. This way, if it's possible, the naval assets perform the primary defense. Only if a boarding is imminent do the defense teams engage the pirates with small arms or other means while providing recorded, secure transmissions of what occurs for use later in courts.
In this way, ships can use the service on a contractual basis, minimizing the company resources required for security in the area, as well as remain able to dock in any port. Additionally, as long as the mother ships can be replenished and maintained in international waters, they can continue to provide long-term support. Depending on the type of ship and the resources available, the mother ships could also act as floating support bases for aviation assets.
The combination would probably be cost effective if there was a significant reduction in captures (and ransoms) and the costs of the service was lower than the costs of capture.
For smaller, perhaps non-commercial shipping, perhaps a weapon or transmitter leasing service might also be worthwhile.
Just an idea...
The Somali pirate problem is a rate problem complicated by an unwillingness or lack of ability for ships to prevent their being taken. One factor is the unwillingness for many international ports to tolerate the carriage of firearms aboard ships docked there. Another is the skill and equipment requirements to successfully fight off attacks. A third is the cost of committing a company's resources to such an effort when it's unnecessary in other locations. If someone had the resources, they could probably solve the problem in a relatively simple way.
Basically, take 3 or 4 mother ships (and a spare) and station them in the shipping lanes outside the pirates' area of control. The mother ships would essentially provide basic amenities and staging locations for a number of professional defense teams. Ships transiting the pirate's area rendezvous with a mother ship, take aboard a defense team and gear, then transit the pirate zone. On the other end, they simply rendezvous with another mother ship and deboard the team.
Within the piracy zone, the defense teams do a number of things. They utilize high quality observational equipment and communication gear to track, identify, and report other traffic. If another craft appears to be a threat, they report it to their mother ship and local naval assets in the area. This way, if it's possible, the naval assets perform the primary defense. Only if a boarding is imminent do the defense teams engage the pirates with small arms or other means while providing recorded, secure transmissions of what occurs for use later in courts.
In this way, ships can use the service on a contractual basis, minimizing the company resources required for security in the area, as well as remain able to dock in any port. Additionally, as long as the mother ships can be replenished and maintained in international waters, they can continue to provide long-term support. Depending on the type of ship and the resources available, the mother ships could also act as floating support bases for aviation assets.
The combination would probably be cost effective if there was a significant reduction in captures (and ransoms) and the costs of the service was lower than the costs of capture.
For smaller, perhaps non-commercial shipping, perhaps a weapon or transmitter leasing service might also be worthwhile.
Just an idea...
Wednesday, January 5, 2011
Have been busy...
...with job search and taking (free) online classes on epidemiology.
For the most part, they are "continuing education" courses for public health professionals, but since I keep throwing apps at epidemiology jobs, I should probably know more.
Some of it is a bit dry, but there's a lot more to public health that's really interesting to me. Part of it really plays with the way I think of myself. In spite of getting a bachelor's degree in psychology, I really find myself leaning toward the biological end of the spectrum when I think about human behavior. Add in a healthy interest in the systemic social relationships in humans as well as an interest in health and disease, you've got much of the non-technical end of epidemiology.
For the most part, they are "continuing education" courses for public health professionals, but since I keep throwing apps at epidemiology jobs, I should probably know more.
Some of it is a bit dry, but there's a lot more to public health that's really interesting to me. Part of it really plays with the way I think of myself. In spite of getting a bachelor's degree in psychology, I really find myself leaning toward the biological end of the spectrum when I think about human behavior. Add in a healthy interest in the systemic social relationships in humans as well as an interest in health and disease, you've got much of the non-technical end of epidemiology.
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